Here are some Farsi that I picked up....
yek - one
doh - two
seh - three
chahr - four
panj - five
shish - six
haft - seven
hasht - eight
noh - nine
dah - ten
bale / a-re - yes
nah - no
khub - good
khub nis - no good
khubi? - are you ok? (informal)
salam - hello
sobh be kheir - good morning
asr be kheir - good evening
shab be kheir - good night
khoda hafez - good bye
Yek shambeh - Sunday
Doh shambeh - Monday
Seh shambeh - Tuesday
Chahr shambeh - Wednesday
Panj shambeh - Thursday
Jumaeh - Friday
Shambeh - Saturday
Farudgah - Airport
Benin Melali - International
Musafiri - Passenger
Tabaghieh - Floor
Medan - Square
Agho-ieh - Mister (Agho-ieh Haza = Mister Haza)
Hanum-eh - Miss (Hanum-eh Ziela = Miss Ziela)
Mohandes - Engineer
Mohandesin - Engineering
Benzin - Petrol (fuel)
Jadeed - New
Khaleej - Gulf
Musykil - Problem
Masalan - Example
For more info about the Farsi language, click this link http://www.masteranylanguage.com/cgi/f/pCat.pl?tc=MALFarsi
Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts
Wednesday, April 28, 2010
Monday, October 12, 2009
Iran a good market for Malaysian goods, says Matrade
DUBAI, Oct 12 — Despite the challenges of doing business with Iran, the Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation (Matrade) views the Islamic republic as a fertile ground for Malaysian exports.Matrade's senior trade commissioner based in Dubai, Dzulkifli Mahmud, said Malaysian exports to the Islamic republic were valued at RM1.19 billion in the first seven months of 2009.
In a further sign of Iranian importers and buyers' growing confidence in high-quality Malaysian products, a Matrade-led Malaysian business delegation succeeded in securing export orders worth RM13.39 million at the just-concluded Ninth Tehran International Industry Fair.
"Most of the Malaysian companies which participated in the fair are new to this market and they're very pleased with the export sales and orders received from Iranian buyers," Dzulkifli told Bernama on the outcome of the Oct 6 to 9 trade fair organised in the Iranian capital.
Malaysia exported RM2.45 billion worth of products to Iran last year. A total of 28 Malaysian companies took part in the exhibition which also marked the fifth participation by Matrade since 2005.
Among Malaysian products which had been well-received by Iranian buyers included building materials, vacuum cleaners, wooden items, industrial rubber products, agriculture pumps, chemicals for oil and gas sector, brake pads and rubber autoparts, solar water heater and car accessories.
"Matrade sees the prospect of exporting more products from Malaysia to the Iranian market as very bright. Iranian buyers now look at Malaysia as a country to source high quality products and services," Dzulkifli said.
He said the Matrade office would continue to assist Malaysian companies in penetrating the Iranian market comprising around 70 million people, 2.6 times the size of Malaysia's population.
"The Iranian market is a growing market and there's good demand locally for consumer products imported from overseas," he said, adding that Iranian buyers preferred high-quality and value-for-money products. — Bernama
From HERE
Wednesday, September 23, 2009
No curvy mannequins in Iran shop windows
TEHRAN, Sept 23 — Iranian police warned shopkeepers yesterday not to use mannequins without headscarves or which exposed body curves, official news agency IRNA reported."Using unusual mannequins exposing the body curves and with the heads without hijabs (Muslim veil) are prohibited to be used in the shops," Iran's moral security police in charge of Islamic dress codes said in a statement carried by IRNA.
Iranian police have stepped up a crackdown on both women and men, boutiques and small companies which fail to enforce strict religious dress codes since President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came to office in 2005.
The measures are the latest in a country-wide campaign against Western cultural influences in the Islamic Republic, where strict dress codes are enforced.
"Both showing necktie and bowtie behind the windows ... and (the) selling (of) women's underwear by men are prohibited," said the police statement.
In the past, crackdowns tended to be launched at the start of Iran's hot summers and petered out soon after. But last year they extended into winter and included a drive against tight women's trousers and even men with spiky "Western" hairstyles.
Those who violate dress codes are usually cautioned on a first offence, sometimes after a brief visit to a police station. But they can be detained for longer, taken to court and required to have "guidance classes" after repeat offences.
Dress codes are most often flouted in wealthier, urban areas. Conservative dress is the norm in poorer, rural areas. — Reuters
From HERE
Sunday, June 21, 2009
The Devil is in the digits
It's quite interesting what numbers can do for, or to, you.... they can reveal a lot of things if we dig deeper and look at it from difference perspectives.
By Bernd Beber and Alexandra Scacco
TEHRAN, June 21 — Since the declaration of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s landslide victory in Iran’s presidential election, accusations of fraud have swelled.
Against expectations from pollsters and pundits alike, Ahmadinejad did surprisingly well in urban areas, including Tehran — where he is thought to be highly unpopular — and even Tabriz, the capital city of opposition candidate Mir Hussein Mousavi’s native East Azarbaijan province.
Others have pointed to the surprisingly poor performance of Mehdi Karroubi, another reform candidate, and particularly in his home province of Lorestan, where conservative candidates fared poorly in 2005, but where Ahmadinejad allegedly captured 71 per cent of the vote.
Eyebrows have been raised further by the relative consistency in Ahmadinejad’s vote share across Iran’s provinces, in spite of wide provincial variation in past elections.
These pieces of the story point in the direction of fraud, to be sure.
They have led experts to speculate that the election results released by Iran’s Ministry of the Interior had been altered behind closed doors. But we don’t have to rely on suggestive evidence alone. We can use statistics more systematically to show that this is likely what happened. Here’s how.
We’ll concentrate on vote counts — the number of votes received by different candidates in different provinces — and in particular the last and second-to-last digits of these numbers. For example, if a candidate received 14,579 votes in a province (Karroubi’s actual vote count in Isfahan), we’ll focus on digits 7 and 9.
This may seem strange, because these digits usually don’t change who wins. In fact, last digits in a fair election don’t tell us anything about the candidates, the make-up of the electorate or the context of the election.
They are random noise in the sense that a fair vote count is as likely to end in 1 as it is to end in 2, 3, 4, or any other numeral. But that’s exactly why they can serve as a litmus test for election fraud. For example, an election in which a majority of provincial vote counts ended in 5 would surely raise red flags.
Why would fraudulent numbers look any different? The reason is that humans are bad at making up numbers. Cognitive psychologists have found that study participants in lab experiments asked to write sequences of random digits will tend to select some digits more frequently than others.
So what can we make of Iran’s election results? We used the results released by the Ministry of the Interior and published on the web site of Press TV, a news channel funded by Iran’s government. The ministry provided data for 29 provinces, and we examined the number of votes each of the four main candidates — Ahmadinejad, Mousavi, Karroubi and Mohsen Rezai — is reported to have received in each of the provinces — a total of 116 numbers.
The numbers look suspicious. We find too many 7s and not enough 5s in the last digit. We expect each digit (0, 1, 2, and so on) to appear at the end of 10 per cent of the vote counts. But in Iran’s provincial results, the digit 7 appears 17 per cent of the time, and only 4 per cent of the results end in the number 5.
Two such departures from the average — a spike of 17 per cent or more in one digit and a drop to 4 per cent or less in another — are extremely unlikely. Fewer than four in a hundred non-fraudulent elections would produce such numbers.
As a point of comparison, we can analyse the state-by-state vote counts for John McCain and Barack Obama in last year’s US presidential election. The frequencies of last digits in these election returns never rise above 14 per cent or fall below 6 per cent, a pattern we would expect to see in seventy out of a hundred fair elections.
But that’s not all.
Psychologists have also found that humans have trouble generating non-adjacent digits (such as 64 or 17, as opposed to 23) as frequently as one would expect in a sequence of random numbers. To check for deviations of this type, we examined the pairs of last and second-to-last digits in Iran’s vote counts. On average, if the results had not been manipulated, 70 per cent of these pairs should consist of distinct, non-adjacent digits.
Not so in the data from Iran: Only 62 per cent of the pairs contain non-adjacent digits. This may not sound so different from 70 per cent, but the probability that a fair election would produce a difference this large is less than 4.2 per cent.
And while our first test — variation in last-digit frequencies — suggests that Rezai’s vote counts are the most irregular, the lack of non-adjacent digits is most striking in the results reported for Ahmadinejad.
Each of these two tests provides strong evidence that the numbers released by Iran’s Ministry of the Interior were manipulated. But taken together, they leave very little room for reasonable doubt. The probability that a fair election would produce both too few non-adjacent digits and the suspicious deviations in last-digit frequencies described earlier is less than .005.
In other words, a bet that the numbers are clean is a one in two-hundred long shot. — Washington Post
* Bernd Beber and Alexandra Scacco, Ph.D. candidates in political science at Columbia University, will be assistant professors in New York University’s Wilf Family Department of Politics this fall.
By Bernd Beber and Alexandra Scacco
TEHRAN, June 21 — Since the declaration of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s landslide victory in Iran’s presidential election, accusations of fraud have swelled.
Against expectations from pollsters and pundits alike, Ahmadinejad did surprisingly well in urban areas, including Tehran — where he is thought to be highly unpopular — and even Tabriz, the capital city of opposition candidate Mir Hussein Mousavi’s native East Azarbaijan province.
Others have pointed to the surprisingly poor performance of Mehdi Karroubi, another reform candidate, and particularly in his home province of Lorestan, where conservative candidates fared poorly in 2005, but where Ahmadinejad allegedly captured 71 per cent of the vote.
Eyebrows have been raised further by the relative consistency in Ahmadinejad’s vote share across Iran’s provinces, in spite of wide provincial variation in past elections.
These pieces of the story point in the direction of fraud, to be sure.
They have led experts to speculate that the election results released by Iran’s Ministry of the Interior had been altered behind closed doors. But we don’t have to rely on suggestive evidence alone. We can use statistics more systematically to show that this is likely what happened. Here’s how.
We’ll concentrate on vote counts — the number of votes received by different candidates in different provinces — and in particular the last and second-to-last digits of these numbers. For example, if a candidate received 14,579 votes in a province (Karroubi’s actual vote count in Isfahan), we’ll focus on digits 7 and 9.
This may seem strange, because these digits usually don’t change who wins. In fact, last digits in a fair election don’t tell us anything about the candidates, the make-up of the electorate or the context of the election.
They are random noise in the sense that a fair vote count is as likely to end in 1 as it is to end in 2, 3, 4, or any other numeral. But that’s exactly why they can serve as a litmus test for election fraud. For example, an election in which a majority of provincial vote counts ended in 5 would surely raise red flags.
Why would fraudulent numbers look any different? The reason is that humans are bad at making up numbers. Cognitive psychologists have found that study participants in lab experiments asked to write sequences of random digits will tend to select some digits more frequently than others.
So what can we make of Iran’s election results? We used the results released by the Ministry of the Interior and published on the web site of Press TV, a news channel funded by Iran’s government. The ministry provided data for 29 provinces, and we examined the number of votes each of the four main candidates — Ahmadinejad, Mousavi, Karroubi and Mohsen Rezai — is reported to have received in each of the provinces — a total of 116 numbers.
The numbers look suspicious. We find too many 7s and not enough 5s in the last digit. We expect each digit (0, 1, 2, and so on) to appear at the end of 10 per cent of the vote counts. But in Iran’s provincial results, the digit 7 appears 17 per cent of the time, and only 4 per cent of the results end in the number 5.
Two such departures from the average — a spike of 17 per cent or more in one digit and a drop to 4 per cent or less in another — are extremely unlikely. Fewer than four in a hundred non-fraudulent elections would produce such numbers.
As a point of comparison, we can analyse the state-by-state vote counts for John McCain and Barack Obama in last year’s US presidential election. The frequencies of last digits in these election returns never rise above 14 per cent or fall below 6 per cent, a pattern we would expect to see in seventy out of a hundred fair elections.
But that’s not all.
Psychologists have also found that humans have trouble generating non-adjacent digits (such as 64 or 17, as opposed to 23) as frequently as one would expect in a sequence of random numbers. To check for deviations of this type, we examined the pairs of last and second-to-last digits in Iran’s vote counts. On average, if the results had not been manipulated, 70 per cent of these pairs should consist of distinct, non-adjacent digits.
Not so in the data from Iran: Only 62 per cent of the pairs contain non-adjacent digits. This may not sound so different from 70 per cent, but the probability that a fair election would produce a difference this large is less than 4.2 per cent.
And while our first test — variation in last-digit frequencies — suggests that Rezai’s vote counts are the most irregular, the lack of non-adjacent digits is most striking in the results reported for Ahmadinejad.
Each of these two tests provides strong evidence that the numbers released by Iran’s Ministry of the Interior were manipulated. But taken together, they leave very little room for reasonable doubt. The probability that a fair election would produce both too few non-adjacent digits and the suspicious deviations in last-digit frequencies described earlier is less than .005.
In other words, a bet that the numbers are clean is a one in two-hundred long shot. — Washington Post
* Bernd Beber and Alexandra Scacco, Ph.D. candidates in political science at Columbia University, will be assistant professors in New York University’s Wilf Family Department of Politics this fall.
Monday, June 15, 2009
Police break up Iranian protest in KL
I got these photos and news from the Malaysian Insider website. Gosh, I thought they only fire tear gas at violent demonstrators....or opposition party members... or people in the mosque.
Iranians are also not spared? I mean, how violent can they be?
A Reuters photographer even said that the protesters were leaving when the tear gassing started.
I don’t actually know what it’s like at the UN Office, but I think to fire tear gas at a dispersing demonstrators needs some justifications.
KUALA LUMPUR, June 15 – Malaysian police used tear gas to break up a crowd of around 500 Iranians demonstrating outside the United Nations mission against Iran's contested presidential election.
The demonstrators gathered on Monday after a landslide victory for hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Friday’s election.
“The protesters handed in a memo and were leaving when the police fired two rounds of teargas,” said a Reuters photographer.
Ahmadinejad beat challenger Mirhossein Mousavi in Friday's poll and the opposition has charged the incumbent with rigging the polls which triggered protests in Iran. – Reuters
Sunday, June 14, 2009
What happened in Iran?
Just got an email this morning from the HR. Business travel to Iran is temporarily restricted?
There're some public disturbances in Iran, due to the dissatisfaction with the Presidential Election results.
I thought Iranian are peaceful people. But from what I heard today, already 19 are dead.
I guess politics can change a lot of things. It can turn man into cannibals, neighbours into murderers, friends into foes.
Now what do we get out of it?
Sent from MY BlackBerry® device
There're some public disturbances in Iran, due to the dissatisfaction with the Presidential Election results.
I thought Iranian are peaceful people. But from what I heard today, already 19 are dead.
I guess politics can change a lot of things. It can turn man into cannibals, neighbours into murderers, friends into foes.
Now what do we get out of it?
Sent from MY BlackBerry® device
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